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The 2008 election was different from the last two presidential elections in that there was a 
clear winner on Election Day and the winner was a Democrat, Barack Obama.  Controversies 
over voting technology that raged in 2000 and 2004 were relatively dormant.  Instead, the 
election controversies that did come up were mostly discussions of lines to vote.
1
  This lack of 
discussion does not mean that there were not important issues related to voting technology 
that took place in 2008, just that they were not things deemed important by the media. 
 In fact, the 2008 election has proven to be a watershed election in voting technology 
considered more broadly because in this election, more than one-third of voters nationally 
voted before election day.  As the 2008 Survey of the Performance of American Elections 
(Alvarez, Ansolabehere, Berinsky, Lenz, Stewart III, & Hall, 2009) noted, “37% of voters cast 
their ballots before Election Day, either in-person at early voting centers (18%) or by mail, 
mainly via absentee ballots (19%).  The elderly, individuals with disabilities, and better-
educated voters were more likely to use these “convenience voting” methods.”  This slow 
revolution in voting is requiring election officials, policy makers, and voters alike to rethink 
what elections mean, how voting technologies function in this new environment, and how laws, 
processes, and procedures need to be updated to reflect this new reality.  The old mindset of 
election day as a singular event is no longer a reality.  In that vein, voting technology is not 
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some “thing” that is used by a voter to vote but rather is part of a larger process that runs from 
pre-election voting machine testing through post-election audits. 
Every election involves an important interaction between technology, people, and 
processes.  The focus on voting technology—especially voting technology in a single election 
day implementation—to the relative exclusion of people and processes is problematic in 
several respects.  First, it puts undue credit or blame for election problems on the inanimate 
technology used in the election.  If voters or poll workers have problem with a voting 
technology because of poor voter education or ineffective poll worker training, a technology-
centered focus means that the voting technology caused this problem.  Second, the lack of 
focus on people and processes also limits the ability of policy makers to understand how to 
improve the system in which the election occurred.  Finally, there may be severe gaps in people 
and process issues that may go unexamined unless there is an evaluation of the people and 
process components as well.  The movement to convenience voting is likely to exacerbate these 
issues. 
In this paper, I review the people, process, and technology aspects of voting.  In 
particular, I consider the evaluations of all three that occurred after the 2008 election.  Then we 
consider where we stand in relations to innovations with voting technology and the path 
forward for improving this aspect of voting, both in the United States and internationally.   
Voting Technology 
In 2000, America was introduced to the role that voting technology plays in elections.  The 
problems with unreadable paper ballots in that election have been well studied and issues with 
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electronic voting that have occurred in 2002 through 2007 have been well studied as well.
 2
  The 
basic study of voting technology has been the examination of residual votes.  Work in this area 
has been around for some time, in the study of ballot roll-off, but the Caltech/MIT Voting 
Technology Project (VTP) made this a focal point of their initial studies of the 2000 election and 
subsequent work by Charles Stewart and others has extended this research.
3
  Stewart (2006) 
found that, in the 2004 election, residual vote rates declined across jurisdictions compared to 
the 2000 residual vote rates, regardless of the type of voting technology used.  This suggests 
that there was some educational or management affect that led to a reduction in residual 
votes.  However, Stewart also found that switching systems reduced residual vote rates even 
more.  Residual votes were lowest in those jurisdictions that switched from punch cards or from 
optical scan voting to Direct Recording Electronic Voting equipment (DREs).  Alvarez and Hall 
(2008a) found that there are important variations in residual vote rates attributable to 
switching voting technologies; DREs resulted in lower residual vote rates than did switching to 
optical scan voting.  However, there were wider variations across the DRE jurisdictions 
compared to the optical scan jurisdictions, suggesting that administrative talent may more 
closely relate to successful implementation of DREs compared to optical scan technologies. 
 In addition, the work of Herrnson, Niemi, Hanmer, et al. (2008) provided a 
comprehensive study of the way in which individuals interact with voting technologies.  In their 
work, they had actual voters simulate the voting process across an array of voting technologies.  
They discovered that important issues like ballot design—such as (1) standard office-block 
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ballot versus (2) office-block ballot with straight party voting feature versus (3) party column 
ballot—affect how individuals interact with voting technologies.  They also determined that not 
all voting technologies are equal.  Voters interact with various voting technologies differently, 
make different mistakes across technologies, and have different evaluations of the quality of 
the experience they have with these various voting technologies.  
People 
One of the interesting features of these studies is that many of the problems that exist with all 
voting technologies is the human-technology interaction.  Alvarez and Hall (2004, 2008a) note 
that there are analogous problems with voting technologies, whether a person votes on paper 
or electronically, and document such analogous problems in both electronic and paper voting.  
Quite simply, problems with technologies are often problems not with the technology itself but 
with the way in which people—poll workers, voters, or election officials—interact with that 
technology.  Even residual votes have at their root a human-machine interaction.   
Studies of voter confidence and the quality of the voting experience, gathered from 
both voters and poll workers, have expanded our knowledge about voting technology.  One of 
the key new variables that have been studied in this regard is voter confidence.  Starting in 
2004 there have been systematic studies of the interaction between voting technology and 
voter confidence.
4
  This research gives us important purchase on the question of how 
individuals perceive voting technologies.  
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 The most recent work on this topic has been conducted by Charles Stewart (2009).  
Using data from the 2008 Survey of the American Electorate, supplemented with voting 
technology data collected by Election Data Services, Stewart was able to determine how voting 
technology affected a voter’s confidence.  Stewart found that there are important interactions 
between voter confidence in DREs and the voter’s ideology; strong liberals are less confident in 
DRE technologies than are other voters.  He also found that DRE voters were less confident 
than voters who voted on optical scan ballots (although paper ballot and lever machines voters 
were more confident than were optical scan voters).  Stewart replicated and extended the work 
done by Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn (2008) and (Atkeson & Saunders, 2007)about voter 
confidence.  He also clearly shows that attitudes about voting technology are affected by an 
individual’s ideological preferences.  The 2008 Survey of the Performance of American Elections 
also found that fewer than two percent of voters reported any voting machine problem in the 
2008 election.  However, these types of problems did lower voter confidence severely if they 
occurred. 
Finally, and important to the idea that voting technology is part of a larger interaction 
between people, process, and technology, Stewart examined the question of whether DRE 
voters waited longer in line to vote.  The answer to this is both simple and complex; the simple 
answer is that yes, DRE voters did wait in line longer than paper ballot voters.  The complex 
answer is that DRE voters wait in longer lines not because of the DREs but because of 
management and administrative decisions.  Lines were far more associated with race and 
population density than the voting technology used.  In fact, when race and population density 
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are included in a model with DREs, the DRE variable is not a significant reason why voters wait 
in line.   
The other aspect of the people question in elections is the poll workers.  Research on 
poll workers has found that the image of elections being run by 72-year-old poll workers is an 
urban legend.  Systematic studies of poll workers in Iowa, Ohio, New Mexico, Utah, and from 
national survey data all have found that poll workers have a median age ranging between 55 
and 67.
5
  Several of these studies have also found close links between poll worker training and 
poll worker attitudes regarding voting technology.  Poll workers are not afraid of new voting 
technologies, which is not surprising since a large percentage of poll workers started as poll 
workers after the 2000 election.  However, well-trained poll workers tend to have fewer 
problems with implementing any voting technology and tend to be more confident in the 
electoral process (Hall, Monson, & Patterson, 2008).  Given the importance of poll worker-voter 
interactions in affecting voter confidence, the training of these poll workers receive can be 
critical not only in ensuring that the voting technology is well-implemented but also that the 
voters are confident in the election process  (Hall, Monson, & Patterson, Forthcoming).  
Process 
The largest issue in election administration that has been less studied is the actual 
administration of the processes and procedures that govern the implementation of voting 
technology and the environment in which such implementations occur.  The chain of custody 
rules for elections are critical for ensuring that election rules are implemented uniformly, 
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correctly, and in a way that secures that ballots and voting technology correctly, especially 
given how decentralized election administration is in the United States (Alvarez & Hall, 2008b;  
(Alvarez & Hall, 2006).  These rules have become of interest in some election audit work, which 
considers the way in which elections are implemented on election day in polling places  
(Atkeson, Alvarez, & Hall, 2007; Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 2008) but less 
so in the implementation of voting technologies.   
For instance, the chain of custody rules that govern how voting systems are secured 
during the electoral process were not a part of the “top-to-bottom” voting system review that 
was done in California in 2007.
6
  The California review of voting systems did not include an 
evaluation of these systems within a functional environment that took into account the way in 
which the law requires voting systems to be secured.  For example, the security and operations 
of the voting system were considered largely without taking into account the existence of poll 
workers in polling places, the use of security seals and logs, and the conduct of various testing 
procedures before and after the election.   
The California experience can be contrasted with a similar review that was conducted in 
Alaska.
7
  In the Alaska study, the voting systems were tested within the context of how voting 
technologies are implemented.  Therefore, their security recommendations included factors 
such as (1) improving poll worker training related to security, (2) using security seals and 
tamper-proof tape to secure the envelopes and shipping containers used when voting machines 
and ballots are in transit, (3) improving password selection and the frequency of changes to 
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passwords, and (4) better tracking of voting machines and ballots through the use of inventory 
control technologies (e.g., bar codes).   
One other interesting process in elections that has been relatively unstudied is absentee 
voting.  The process of handling such ballots, the issue of when and whether they are returned, 
and the disposition of such ballots by election officials has only been subject to a small number 
of evaluations (e.g.,  Imai & King, 2004; Alvarez, Hall, & Sinclair, 2008).  Absentee voting is a 
growing mode of voting yet understanding the intersection of people and this specific process 
are not well-understood (Fortier, 2006).  For example, several studies have found that absentee 
voters are less confident that their ballot will be counted compared to election day voters 
(Alvarez, Hall, & Llewellyn, 2008; Alvarez, Ansolabehere, Berinsky, Lenz, Stewart III, & Hall, 
2009; Atkeson & Saunders, 2007; Stewart III, 2009) yet this voting mode was not included in the 
voting system security studies conducted in Alaska, California, or Ohio.  The 2008 Survey of the 
Performance of American Elections did find relatively few problems associated with absentee 
voting but it is not clear whether individuals avoid absentee voting because of concerns that 
they have with this voting process. 
Innovation in Voting and the Future of Voting 
Currently, the largest technological innovation related to voting technology is Internet 
voting.  This voting technology is used commonly in Switzerland and Estonia but it represents 
an innovation in the United States, especially for overseas civilians and military personnel 
(Alvarez & Hall, 2008a; McNeal & Tolbert, 2004; Trechsel & Mendez, 2005; Trechsel, Schwerdt, 
Breuer, Alvarez, & Hall, 2007).  There have only been a small number of experiments with 
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Internet voting in the United States but two of them were conducted in the 2008 election cycle.  
The first case was implemented in March 2008, when the Democrats Abroad conducted their 
primary election for the Democratic presidential primary using Internet voting as one mode for 
voting.  This effort was implemented without any problems and thousands of voters used this 
mode.   
However, even this remote voting technology is being re-thought in the United States, 
with greater consideration given to the people and process component of this type of remote 
voting.  In the November 2008 general election, Okaloosa County Florida allowed overseas 
voters to vote over the Internet from kiosk locations in the United Kingdom, Japan, and 
Germany.  This was not traditional remote internet voting; instead, voters had to vote from 
specific Internet voting polling locations, which allowed the election officials greater control 
over the Internet voting process.  The voter verification process used in the kiosks were quite 
robust and the physical security of the equipment could be greater because of the kiosk design. 
The Okaloosa County kiosk voting process was used by 93 voters (one additional voter 
started the process but did not cast a ballot); 40 of the voters were in England, 33 voters were 
in Germany, and 21 voters were in Japan.  The system did not have wide usage but also was not 
tested in either of the two primary war zones—Iraq and Afghanistan—where there would be 
the most potential users.  However, as a test of concept in rethinking the remote voting 
process, it was a successful attempt to reconsider how the process and people in the Internet 
voting equation can be reconsidered. 
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Internet voting represents an interesting medium for understanding the future of voting 
because this new mode of voting requires election offiicals and policy makers to think through 
carefully the way in which a technology—voting over the Internet—can improve the election 
process for voters, especially special populations of voters such as overseas civilians and 
military personnel overseas.  The barriers to voting for these individuals highlights the problems 
that arise when certain groups of voters have difficulties navigating the voting process and 
there are not effective technologies to address their problems.   
Internet voting also highlights how much of the voting process, but especially voter 
registration, is predicated on an election world governed by paper.  For example, the National 
Voter Registration Act (NVRA) was written in a time pre-internet and other electronic 
technologies and its requirements—as well as many other election laws at the federal and state 
level—have not kept up with things such as digital signatures, electronic data transmission, and 
similar ways to faciliate services using the Internet or even email.  There is a great need to 
experiment more with Internet voting, as well as electronic mechanisms for registering voters 
and supplying voters with information.  These experiments have the capacity to move the 
debate over voting forward and to promote better election management.  
Conclusions 
As U.S. elections move more toward convenience voting, the integration of people, 
processes, and technologies will continue to be an important issue.  The example of the 
California review of voting is a case in point; the State has almost 42% of its votes cast via 
absentee balloting but the review of the State’s voting system did not consider absentee voting 
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to be a voting system.  If voting is not considered holistically, then focus on technology to the 
detriment of processes and people can lead to implementations of voting systems that have 
weaknesses in their chains of custody.  Voting technology needs to be thought of not merely as 
a piece of hardware or piece of paper, but as an integral part of a larger activity, that is, election 
administration.  
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